The Conquest of Arsuf by Baybars: Political and Military Aspects

A modern-day visitor to Arsuf cannot help but be struck by the neatly arranged piles of stones from siege machines found at the site. This ordering, of course, represents the labors of contemporary archeologists and their assistants to gather the numerous but scattered stones. Yet, in spite of the recent nature of this “installation,” these heaps are clear, if mute, evidence of the great efforts of the Mamluks led by Sultan Baybars (1260–77) to conquer the fortified city from the Franks in 1265. This conquest, as well as its political background and its aftermath, will be the subjects of the present article, which can also be seen as a case-study of Mamluk siege warfare.

The immediate backdrop to the Mamluk attack against Arsuf was the events of the preceding weeks. At the end of 1264, while Baybars was hunting in the Egyptian countryside, he received reports that the Mongols were heading in force for the Mamluk border fortress of al-Birah along the Euphrates, today in southeastern Turkey. The sultan quickly returned to Cairo, and ordered the immediate dispatch of advanced light forces, which were followed by a more organized, but still relatively small, force under the command of the senior amir (officer) Ughan Samm al-Mawt (“the Elixir of Death”), and then by a third corps, together with
important officers. Orders were also dispatched to Syria so that the governor of Aleppo and the Ayyubid prince of Ḥamāh would join the expeditionary force, together with the troops of Damascus. Finally, the bedouins of northern Syria, under the command of their leader (ʼĪsā ibn Muhannā) were ordered to cross the desert so as to raid Ḥarrān, apparently to act as a diversion. It should be noted that according to Ibn ʻAbd al-Žāhir, Baybars’ privy secretary and the main source for these and the following events, the sultan also received intelligence that unspecified Franks had informed the Mongols that at this time the Mamluk army was split up throughout the country for the (annual) grazing of their horses, and thus it was an appropriate time to launch a raid on the northern frontiers of the sultan’s realm.

Throughout the month of January 1265, Baybars busied himself with preparing the lion’s share of his army for the campaign. He left Cairo on 27 January and arrived at Gaza thirteen days later. Initial reports from al-Bīrah indicated that this was a large-scale Mongol raid, perhaps the beginnings of a serious offensive into Syria. The sultan wrote, ordering Ughan to make haste, although he himself elected to remain in Palestine. It appears that Baybars thought it prudent to wait upon developments before committing his forces to the north. He devoted himself to hunting in the region. Subsequently at his camp near Yabnā (Ibelin), he received a report that the Mongols—facing concerted opposition from the garrison at al-Bīrah and learning of the approach of the relieving force—had withdrawn. Baybars received this happy news on 26 Rabī‘ II 663/15 February 1265, four days after the Mongols’ retreat, a clear indication of the efficiency of the Mamluks’ communication network, based on a pigeon-post and horse relays. The commanders of the expeditionary force received orders to remain in the area of al-Bīrah to assist inter alia in the repair of the fortress. A large share of the army, then, would not be participating in the events in Palestine of the next few weeks, although the sultan still had a significant force with him.

The danger from the Mongols having been averted for the time being, the sultan now turned his attention to the local Franks. First, he organized a hunting expedition in the forests of Arsūf, interestingly enough to hunt lions (al-sībā‘). It is clear that the sultan’s goals were more than just sport: he was able “under cover”

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4It is also possible that news had reached the besiegers that Hülegū Ilkhan had just died. See the discussion in Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, 113 and note 29.

5Ibid., 112–14; Thorau, Lion of Egypt, 112.
to gather intelligence about the nearby fortifications; the large-scale hunt was also an opportunity to put the troops through maneuvers. Thereupon, he made a quick jaunt to Arṣūf and Caesarea (Qaysarīyah) to check them out before returning to his camp, now at the Awjā’ or Yarkon River. From there he ordered the construction of unspecified siege machines (manjaniqāt) from locally gathered wood: four large ones were built, besides numerous small machines. Orders were sent out to unnamed castles to assemble more siege machines, as well as skilled workers and stonemasons (al-ṣunnā’ wa-al-ḥajjārīn). Meanwhile, the already present troops were ordered to build ladders, probably also from locally-collected wood. From Awjā’ the sultan moved with his troops to ‘Uyun al-Asāwir. Al-Maqrīzī writes that this location was in Wādī ‘Ārah and ‘Ar’arah. Although this is not in his apparent source (Ibn al-Furāt), al-Maqrīzī appears to have acquired reliable information, either from an independent source or from his own geographical knowledge. In Sheet XII of the maps of the Survey of Western Palestine (ca. 1880), I have found a site called ‘Uyun al-Asāwir, but it is in the Jordan Valley, near Wādī al-Māliẖ, about 50 kms southeast of Caesarea. This is clearly not a candidate for the location in question. But in Sheet VIII, one finds immediately south of the entrance of Wādī ‘Ārah a location called Tall al-Asāwir. This surely must be the location referred to by the sources, and is about 15 kms in a straight line from Caesarea. Although it may have taken Baybars a bit out of his way, it is not illogical for him to have gone there: this may have been a feint, and in any event he could make sure that no Frankish forces were going to surprise him from the north, via one of the main routes through the Carmel range. From there the sultan moved to the coast: on 9 Jumādā I 663/27 February he appeared suddenly at Caesarea.

6This is similar in intent, if not in scope, to the hunting circles organized by the Mongols; see David Morgan, The Mongols (Oxford, 1986), 84–85; S. Jagchid and Paul Hyer, Mongolia’s Culture and Society (Boulder and Folkestone, 1979), 27–37. This evidence leads me to revise a statement in Mongols and Mamluks, 218, that the Mamluks did not conduct cavalry exercises cum hunting expeditions.

7Wādī ‘Ārah (in Hebrew: Nahal Írōn) cuts across the Carmel range from the southwest to the northeast; the northern entrance is near Megiddo, while its southern opening is about 15 km as the crow flies to the east of Caesarea. ‘Ar’arah is a village some five miles to the north of the southern entrance of Wādī ‘Ārah. Following the modern roads, it is about a 25 km march from this village to Caesarea.

8Al-Maqrīzī, Kitāb al-Sulūk li-Ma’rifat Duwal al-Mulūk, ed. Muhammad Muṣṭafā Ziyādah et al. (Cairo, 1934–74), 1:526. On his reliance for these events on Ibn al-Furāt, Tārīkh al-Duwal wa-al-Mulūk, who in turn cites by name Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, Rawd, see below.

9C. R. Condor and H. H. Kitchener, Maps of Western Palestine (London, 1880), sheets VIII and XII.

10This summary is based on Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, Rawd, 229–30.
[Caesarea] was immediately encircled and stormed by the Muslim army. Taken by surprise, the defenders gave up the gates and walls after a short resistance, and withdrew into the citadel, while the attackers stormed into the town. Now began the struggle for the citadel. It lay on a peninsula, which, without naval support, could in practice be attacked from the town on one side only. . . . [T]he citadel was the target of stones and Greek fire from the catapults, and its defenders were overwhelmed by a shower of arrows from the siege-towers. . . . When a siege-tower was successfully brought up to the wall, the sultan himself joined in the fighting, and satisfied himself of [sic] the siege operations. . . . On 15 Jumādā I/5 March the defenders in Caesarea surrendered the citadel, withdrew to ships . . . and sailed to Acre. Baybars ordered the town and citadel to be razed, probably in order to prevent once and for all Caesarea ever again being used as a bridgehead for a Crusading army.11

During the siege, Baybars had dispatched small forces to raid in various directions: Syrian troops went off to Baysān, while nomads—bedouins and Turcomans—harried the region of Acre.12 No doubt these raids were aimed at both gathering intelligence and keeping the Franks off balance and thus unable to extend assistance to their brethren in Caesarea. In the aftermath of the conquest, while the majority of the army was busy dismantling Caesarea, Baybars himself raided the outskirts of ‘Athlīth, before succeeding in taking Haifa, which was also destroyed.13 He thereupon returned to Caesarea, where the destructive work continued. There a Frankish delegation of unknown provenance was warmly received. Meanwhile, more siege machines arrived from al-Ṣubaybah in the Golan, and Baybars was ready for his next goal, which he kept secret for the time being. On 29 Jumādā/19 March he left Caesarea; two days later he took up position at Arsūf.14

Before proceeding to the description of the actual siege of Arsūf, I would like to make two points. The first is of a historiographical nature. Virtually all of our information on the conduct of the siege, as well as the preceding events and

11Thorau, Lion of Egypt, 160–61.
12Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir, Rawd, 231.
13Ibid., 234, who also describes the dispatch of a force which destroyed a castle (qal‘ah) called al-Mulūhah, whose location is unclear. See Thorau, Lion of Egypt, 180, note 11. Haifa was later recovered by the Franks, and it was finally occupied by the Mamluks after the fall of Acre in 1291 ("Hayfā, "The Encyclopaedia of Islam, 2nd ed., 3:325.)
subsequent developments, is derived from the Arabic sources, although some
details can be gleaned from the Frankish sources. As is well known, Mamluk
historiography is extremely rich and voluminous. At times, however, this gives a
mistaken impression of a surfeit of different accounts, when really all we have is
the same account repeated or summarized, usually more or less faithfully, by a
series of writers. (Although, it should be noted, that even in this case, all versions
should be checked, since occasionally a later author introduces significant
information from a different source, even one which is not extant, and which may
not have come down to us otherwise.) Such is the case in the present circumstances.
All the usual Arabic sources for the modern studies of these events—al-Nuwayrī,\textsuperscript{15}
Ibn al-Furāt,\textsuperscript{16} and al-Maqrīzī\textsuperscript{17} are the most prominent—are derived directly or
otherwise from the account of Muḥyī al-Dīn ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir’s biography of
Baybars, \textit{Al-Rawdāt al-Zāhir fī Sīrat al-Malik al-Zāhir}. In fact, al-Maqrīzī’s account
in his chronicle \textit{Kitāb al-Suluḵ lī-Maʿrīfat Duwal al-Mulūk}, the mainstay of much
scholarship on Mamluk-Frankish relations at this time due to its availability in
Quatremère’s translation,\textsuperscript{18} is a somewhat shortened version—and not always an
accurate one—of that related by Ibn al-Furāt in his \textit{Tārīkh al-Duwal wa-al-Mulūk}.\textsuperscript{19}
As usual, the latter does a credible job of relating Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir’s narrative,
and even adds to it from another source.\textsuperscript{20} Yet in spite of the very good edition of
the relevant portion by U. and M. C. Lyons, and their fine translation, the following
discussion will be based on the “real thing,” as given by Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, who
besides his access to the sultan and at least some of his secrets has the added

\textsuperscript{15}Al-Nuwayrī, \textit{Nihāyat al-Arab fī Funūn al-Adab} (Cairo, 1923–97), 30:268–72.
\textsuperscript{16}Ibn al-Furāt, \textit{Tārīkh al-Duwal wa-al-Mulūk}, Staatsbibliothek (Vienna) MS 814, fols. 69b–72b;
most of this section is found in the partial edition published as \textit{Ayyubids, Mamlukes and Crusaders: Selections from the Tārīkh al-Duwal wa-al-Mulūk of Ibn al-
text, 2:73–78.
\textsuperscript{17}Al-Maqrīzī, \textit{Suluḵ}, 1:528–32. As mentioned above, this author does provide one interesting
original, and apparently correct, additional tidbit of geographical information.
\textsuperscript{18}M. Quatremère, \textit{Histoire des sultans mamlouks de l’Égypte} (Paris, 1837–42); this translation
only runs up to 708/1308–9.
\textsuperscript{19}The relationship between the two works is discussed in R. Amitai, “Al-Maqrīzī as a Historian of
the Early Mamluk Sultanate (or: Is al-Maqrīzī an Unrecognized Historiographical Villain?),” \textit{Mamlūk Studies Review} 7, no. 2 (2003): 99–118; one of the examples adduced in that article is the
siege of Arṣūf.
\textsuperscript{20}This is the passage with which he opens the entire section on the siege, taken from Ibn Shaddād
253–54.
advantage of having been present on this campaign. This author has his disadvantages, not the least of which is that he was not a military man, and also his penchant for hyperbole and pro-Baybars panegyric. These, together with some lacunae, can be at least partially rectified by the use of some critical sense, and a look at the physical remnants of the city and the battle.

The second point demands a longer discussion: why is it that Baybars had decided to commence the conquest of Frankish territory in general, and why at this time? The sultan’s relations with the Franks of Palestine had hitherto not been a bed of roses but they did not differ dramatically from those of his Ayyubid predecessors in Syria. True, raiders had set out from Acre in the winter of 1260, evidently hoping to take advantage of the confused state of the country; these, however, were trounced in the Golan by local Muslim troops. But in September of the following year, the sultan had reached a modus vivendi with John of Ibelin, ruler of Jaffa. This was of some importance, as Baybars around this time used that harbor to import grain from Egypt to Syria to help relieve famine in the latter country. By the early fall of this same year, Baybars concluded a treaty with the Franks of Acre, based on one concluded several years before with the last Ayyubid ruler of Damascus, al-Naṣīr Yūsuf; this recognized the status quo and stipulated the exchange of prisoners. This latter provision, however, was not fully carried out, because of Frankish dithering.

21See Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, Rawd, 237, for proof that this writer was present at the siege. Some early Mamluk authors—such as Ibn al-Dawādārī (Kanz al-Durar wa-Jāmi’ al-Ghurār, vol. 8, ed. U. Haarmann [Cairo, 1971], 107), al-Yūnīnī (Dhayl Mir’āt al-Zamān [Hyderabad, 1954–61], 2:318–19), Baybars al-Mansūrī al-Dawādār (Zubdat al-Fikrah fī Tārīkh al-Hijrah: History of the Early Mamluk Period, ed. D. S. Richards [Beirut, 1998], 96)—give accounts independent of Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, but these are so short that they have little if any value; the last mentioned, however, notes that he himself participated in the campaign. J. Prawer, Histoire du royaume latin de Jérusalem (2nd ed., Paris, 1975), 2:467, note 41, remarks on the problematic—if not confused—nature of al-Maqrīzī’s account, and the superiority of Ibn al-Furat’s report, but did not notice that the former is derived from the latter. At the time of his writing, Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir’s text had not been published, let alone translated, and therefore it is understandable that Prawer would not have known of its importance. The annals for the early years of the reign of Baybars are missing in the biography by ʿIzz al-Dīn ibn Shaddād al-Ḥalabī, Tārīkh al-Malik al-Zāhir (Die Geschichte des Sultan Baibars), ed. A. Huṣayt (Wiesbaden, 1983), and thus there is no description of the siege there. The last mentioned writer’s A’lāq, 254, gives a very terse account. Shāfīʿ ibn ʿAlī, Ḥusn al-Manāqib al-Sirrīyah al-Muntaza’ah min al-Sīrah al-Zāhirīyyah, ed. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz al-Khuwaytīr (Riyadh, 1976), 89–90, only gives a summary of Ibn ʿAbd al-Zāhir’s account, and adds nothing new.


23See Thorau, Lion of Egypt, 143–44; Prawer, Histoire, 2:442–47.
In 1263, when Baybars was in Syria dealing with various matters, he launched a series of raids in Palestine, whose targets included the Church of St. Mary in Nazareth and the environs of Acre, where he reached as far as the gates of the city. The sultan’s large army camped at Mt. Tabor and his belligerent rhetoric convinced the Hospitallers to abandon the site without a fight. In the aftermath of these actions, the Franks of Palestine concluded agreements with Mamluk governors in the area to cease hostilities (December 1263). In spite of this, a month later Templars and Hospitallers raided in the area of al-Lajjun (Megiddo). In the early spring of 1264, Mamluk troops raided Ramla, while in June the Franks launched a foray against Ascalon. Baybars retaliated by ordering his governor in the area to raid Caesarea and ‘Athlīth, laying waste to the territory between them. The Franks of Acre, reinforced by the arrival of Oliver of Termes, attacked Baysān in November of this year, causing some damage.24

There is little here to signal a departure from the decades-long policy adopted by local Muslim rulers, although Baybars’ actions were certainly on the militant side, reflecting perhaps his growing self-confidence as he gained control over all Muslim Syria. Why, then, the apparent sudden change vis-à-vis the Franks around 1265, and the adoption of a much more belligerent mien? I think that the explanation is tied to Baybars’ perception of the growing Frankish-Mongol relationships and the attempts to formulate a common policy against the Muslims.25 The name Frank here can refer to both local Franks and their mentors across the sea. Yet with regard to the latter, the first explicit evidence that the sultan knew that the Ilkhans of Iran were maintaining diplomatic contact with Latin rulers to arrange a joint campaign against the Mamluks is only from 1267, when Jaime I of Spain launched an ill-fated crusade after corresponding with Abagha Ilkhan. There are, however, indirect indications that Baybars may have learned from Manfred of Hohenstaufen, ruler of Sicily and southern Italy, that Hülegü had been trying to contact Louis IX of France for the same purpose.26 On the other hand, Mamluk sources give clear evidence that Syrian Franks, and not just those in Antioch—who were known for their pro-Mongol attitudes—were already passing on intelligence to the Mongols. In early 1261, unnamed Franks in Acre had notified Mongol raiders near Aleppo that a Mamluk force was on its way to attack them.27 More to

26Ibid., 52–53; a mistaken date appears on p. 53: it should read 664/1265–66 and not 644/1264–65.
the point in the present context, as mentioned above, Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhīr reports that one of the reasons why the Mongols had chosen to attack al-Bīrah at this time was that Franks of unknown provenance had informed them that the Mamluks were split up and that their horses were out to pasture. After the Mongols had withdrawn, Baybars is said to have complained to the Castellan of Jaffa about the Frankish leaders: “Those people have committed many wrongs against me, such as their writing to the Mongols to attack my territories.”

I am suggesting, therefore, that besides an upgrade of anti-Frankish feeling, albeit within the parameters of traditional policy towards them, a new element had been introduced by the Mamluks under Baybars by the mid-1260s. This was the increasing realization that Frankish leaders in Syria were in contact with the Mongols, assisting them with intelligence, encouraging them to attack the Muslims, and possibly even planning a joint campaign with them (although this is not stated explicitly). In any case, it was becoming increasingly clear to the Mamluk leadership that the Frankish neutrality of 1260, so well analyzed by Peter Jackson in his 1980 article “The Crisis in the Holy Land in 1260,” had been replaced by an ever stronger pro-Mongol tilt. It may be that one contributory factor in Baybars’ growing truculence towards the Franks in the Levant, including the adoption of a strategy of conquest, was the desire to nip the problem in the bud. Even the initial execution of such a strategy would have weakened the local Franks; reduced territory would have meant less of a beachhead for a new crusade if the Franks from across the sea decided to launch an attack in cahoots with the Mongols.

Before getting on with the description of the siege, I will make two more short remarks regarding Arsūf. Firstly, in 1263 Baybars had exchanged letters with Hugh Revel, grandmaster of the Hospitallers. In his letter, Baybars complained that the fortifications of Arsūf had been strengthened in contradiction to a previous agreement. Secondly, in spite of this complaint, around this time Baybars warmly received envoys from Yaffa and Arsūf. The sultan, having received gifts from them, assured both parties that they would not be attacked.

The siege and conquest of Arsūf have been studied in some detail in previous works. These studies have much value, but a number of difficulties remain,
which I will raise in the following discussion. The beginning of the story is simple enough: Baybars arrived at the city on 1 Jumādā II/21 March. He immediately ordered the construction of “covers” (ṣata‘ir), possibly mantlets (mobile shields). This makes perfect sense, given the ready supply of wood, and a large garrison with its own fire-power.

The next stage, however, is not completely clear. According to Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhīr’s account, the sultan ordered that two tunnels (sarābayn) were to be dug from “the moat (khandaq) of the city to the moat of the citadel.” These tunnels were roofed (suqqifat), i.e., reinforced, with wood. Each tunnel was entrusted to several senior officers along with lesser commanders. Thereupon, “a way (ṭarīq) was made from the moat to the citadel.” The language is clear enough: mines reinforced by wood had been dug up to the inner moat, and from there some type of path had been made up to the citadel. What is really going on can be inferred from continued reading of the source and looking at the map.

At this stage there was a Frankish sortie, which attempted “to ignite the wood” (more about this below). The Mamluks, led by Qalāwūn—one of the previously mentioned senior commanders—succeeded, however, in dousing the flames. Here, Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhīr tells us that at this point, “… the barrier of wood in the moat was completed . . .”. The key word here is radm, which Lane translates inter alia as “… an obstruction; a barrier . . . a rampart, or a fortified barrier . . .” It seems, then, that we have some type of wood covering which was found inside the citadel moat, which abutted the exit of at least one of the mines and led at least to the foot of the citadel. This was the “way” (ṭarīq) to the citadel described above, and it was intended to provide

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32Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhīr, Rawd, 235 (=Ibn al-Furāt, Tārīkh al-Duwal, 1:91 [tr. 2:73]; mantlets is given in this translation).

33This word as written causes some problems. E. W. Lane, Arabic-English Dictionary (London, 1863–93, rept., Cambridge, 1984), 1:1341–42, gives the following meaning for sarāb (with no long vowel over the second a): "A subterranean excavation . . . a habitation of a wild animal . . . in, . . . or beneath. . . the earth, or ground . . . [A] secret or hidden place of passage; or . . . it means a road, or way . . . And sarāb ṭarīq means [a] way, or road, in which people follow one another continuously.” The form sarāb exists, but it describes a mirage “or the semblance of water.” This is obviously not the case here. It seems rather that in this particular context, in spite of the slightly different (and probably mistaken) spelling, the first meaning is clearly meant, and we are dealing with two underground tunnels or mines. It should be noted that subsequently Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhīr (Rawd, 236) uses the form sarab to refer to the same tunnel. D. Ayalon, in his article “Ḥisār, iv.-The Mamlūk Sultanate,” EI, 3:473, notes that mines were usually known as naqbiyqūb, but occasionally the term sirb/ṣurūb is found.


35Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhīr, Rawd, 236 (=Ibn al-Furāt, Tārīkh al-Duwal, 1:92 [tr. 2:74]).
cover for advancing Mamluk troops, who would either try scaling the walls at the foot of the citadel or begin mining underneath it.

Since the distance between the moat of the city and the moat of the citadel was quite short on the north, it makes sense that at least one of the mines described above was dug from that direction. It may be, as will be soon seen, that another mine may have run east to west, more or less across from the gate of the citadel; at this point, the distance between the two moats was also not great, although it was longer than on the north. Given that the distance between the southern wall of the city was quite far from the citadel, it seems highly unlikely that tunnels were dug from that direction. Thus the suggestion by M. Benvenisti that the attack on the city commenced from the south is not convincing.

One might ask how the Mamluk soldiers could construct the radm in the inner moat, when on both sides—the citadel and the city—Franks would be raining upon them arrows, stones, and other objects. It may be possible that the north and northeast of the city, which—as noted above—were very narrow at this part, may have been partially or completely abandoned at this point, perhaps due to the slightly higher lay of the land to the north of the city, which gave a certain advantage to the Mamluk archers and artillery. It may be that these sections of the city suffered from heavy fire from both arrows and siege engines, and thus were abandoned—perhaps only temporarily—by the inhabitants, even if the walls there were still at least partially manned. The Mamluks tunneling under this part of the city and then erupting into the inner moat would have therefore been undisturbed from one side. This is all admittedly speculative, but I cannot do better at this point.

The Franks in the citadel, however, were not ready to just sit and watch the Mamluks advance. According to Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir, ‘The Franks used a stratagem when they dug a mine (naqabū) from inside the citadel until they arrived underneath the barrier [in the moat]; they pierced the earth up to the wood.’ The Franks thereupon lit barrels of grease and fat, and whipped up the flames with bellows in the tunnels (nuqūb). This indeed was a well-planned action, showing the sophistication and determination of the Hospitallers, and caught the Mamluks completely off guard. All attempts to quench the fire were unsuccessful.

It should be noted that a tunnel about 70 meters long, most probably of Frankish construction, has been discovered underneath some of the citadel. One end was to the southwest of the citadel, below the moat; the earth here has

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36 Lane, Arabic-English Lexicon, 1:1069.
37 Benvenisti, Crusaders in the Holy Land, 133. Raphael and Tepper reach the same conclusion as expressed here by me through examining the archeological evidence, as seen in the accompanying article.
collapsed into the sea below, and thus the tunnel is entered further in than originally planned (it can be reached at the present time by descending a hanging ladder on a cliff). As the enclosed map shows, the tunnel, which is well built, ran along the south wall, and in one spot—towards the middle—continued under the southern barbican. It appears that the planned second entrance was in the moat, just beyond the entrance to the citadel. At the same time, there is a second branch of the tunnel, about 10 meters in length, which branched off close to this latter opening. This branch has the appearance of being hastily dug. Both of these latter openings are today blocked. The fact that the majority of the tunnel is well and carefully constructed, and given its location and length, leads to the conclusion that we are dealing with a Frankish tunnel that was prepared before the siege. The branch, however, may have been dug during the siege itself, and it may have been the means by which the Franks were able to launch their sortie which led to the destruction of the Mamluk wooden barrier in the moat. It hints that perhaps one of the Mamluk tunnels came in from the east, and abutted the inner moat more or less across from the gate of the citadel.

At about this time, Baybars probably came to the conclusion that these underground probes into the city were not going to bring about the capture of the citadel, and it would thus be pointless to continue the above-described tactic. To successfully attack the citadel across the wide moat, first the entire city had to be taken. To achieve this goal, the sultan ordered a massive engineering project under the direction of two senior amirs. The first, Sunqur al-Rūmī, was to lead a significant part of the officers and troops, and dig a trench (ḥafr), “along the border of the [city] moat” (min ḥāfāt khandaq), from the mouth of one of the above-described tunnels (here referred to as sarab, without the long vowel over the second a) to the sea. The second amir, Qalāwūn al-Alfī, with the remainder of the troops, was to do the same thing from the other tunnel, running along the wall in the other direction to the sea. The trenches were to be hidden by the “wall” (ḥā’it) of the moat of the city, referring, it would seem, to the outside wall of the moat. In this wall, openings (abwāb) were to be dug, and the earth from these was to be dispersed (literally “thrown from” [wa-yurmā al-turāb minhā]). The trench was to be as deep as the moat. An officer known as Aybeg al-Fakhri, one of the Atabeg Aybeg al-Musta’rib’s men, was placed in charge, and he in turn brought in the construction experts to execute this work.39

38 Ibn ʿAbd al-Zāhīr, Rawḍ, 236 (=Ibn al-Furāṭ, Tārīkh al-Duwal, 1:92 [tr. 2:74]).
39 Ibn ʿAbd al-Zāhīr, Rawḍ, 236–37 (=Ibn al-Furāṭ, Tārīkh al-Duwal, 1:92–93 [tr. 2:74]). The translation of Ibn al-Furāṭ is a bit confusing: “Openings were to be dug in this wall from which soil could be thrown down into the ditch until the earth reached the level of that in the moat.” I have translated muhandisīn as “construction experts,” since engineers here might be anachronistic. On this matter, see R. Amitai, “An Arabic Inscription at al-Šubayba (Qalʿat Namrūd) from the
This description is not completely clear. This fuzzy account may be due to the fact that Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir was not a military man. It seems, however, that we can reconstruct the project as follows: parallel to most of the outside perimeter of the city’s moat, a large and deep trench was excavated at some distance, but not too far (as implied by the text, which has the trench “hidden” by the wall of the moat). From the trench, short connecting ditches were dug to the wall, in which openings were made (to enable passage of attackers directly into the moat). The dirt extracted from the excavation was piled up, thereby providing some more protection for the Mamluk soldiers and sappers. It would appear that much of the external wall of the city was abandoned or poorly manned, since otherwise the Mamluks would have encountered difficulty executing the project. No archeological evidence of this massive project has been found yet, but this is not surprising: to the north and south of the city walls, roads and deep drainage trenches have been dug in recent decades (with complete disregard for the archeology of the site, it might be added), and the eastern wall has yet to be excavated.

The above-described excavation work continued for some time, during which the bombardment by the siege machines was kept up. The sultan participated in both activities as well as constant inspections and lobbing off of arrows. Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir takes care to emphasize Baybars’ frenetic yet heroic activities, during which he was often endangered.\textsuperscript{40} That this is more than panegyric or a topos is seen by the numerous examples from the sources attesting to Baybars’ bravery and energy during and between his many campaigns. While standing at a firing post, the sultan was confronted by a Frankish chevauchée. Together with some senior amirs, including Sunqur al-Rūmī (who was wounded) and his trusted mamluk and viceroy Bilik al-Khaznadār, he beat back the Franks.\textsuperscript{41}

In the case of the siege of Arsūf, we have few details about the nature and size of the artillery actually used, called here by the generic terms \textit{majāniq} or \textit{manjanīqāt}. But before the attack on Caesarea—as noted above—when Baybars was laying the groundwork for this campaign, he had some \textit{manjanīqāt} constructed from local wood (four large ones and other small ones), and others were brought from

\textsuperscript{40}See the appreciation of his deeds and personality in Thorau, \textit{Lion of Egypt}, 251–55.

fortresses, probably transported disassembled and then rebuilt on the site. These included the timber for Maghrabi and Frankish-type majānīq, or counterweight trebuchets. During the actual attack on Arsur, additional, unspecified machines arrived from Damascus. The exact types of artillery used in the campaign are also not specified. There is here no mention of Maghrabi or Frankish machines, although it seems that they would have been in the area, and there is no reason not to have used them. On the other hand, from the extant stones found in and around the citadel, it appears that mainly artillery of somewhat modest size and power was employed; one wonders about the whereabouts of the large stones that would have been thrown by the counterweight trebuchets. There is, however, some evidence that traction machines were used. Ibn 'Abd al-Zahir reports that Baybars joined the soldiers in pulling the siege machine (fī jarr al-manjanīqāt; also yajurrū fī majānīq), meaning that the sultan participated in the all-important slinging of the stones, by pulling on the rope which propelled the beam that in turn slung the stones. While this may have been important for morale, and his image as a fighting sultan, no less significant was his constant inspection of the machines. One notable piece of artillery was built by Geremün Agha, whose device was able to shoot seven bolts at one time; one large "arrowhead" has been discovered at the site which might be from a bolt of this type. The commander of the artillery, Aybeg al-Afram, is commended for his diligence in his work.

It was, however, not all work and fighting for the sultan and his troops. The army was accompanied by "pious people, ascetics, legal scholars, and indigent Sufis" (al-‘ubbāb wa-al-zuhhād wa-al-fuqahā‘ wa-al-fuqara‘) and others. How

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43 See the accompanying article by Raphael and Tepper.
44 Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir, Rawd, 237 (=Ibn al-Furat, Tārīkh al-Duwal, 1:94 [tr. 2:75], which gives a paraphrase).
45 On this officer, an important Mongol who had fled to the Sultanate several years before and received a high rank in the Mamluk army, see Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, 108–9.
47 Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir, Rawd, 238 (=Ibn al-Furat, Tārīkh al-Duwal, 1:95 [tr. 2:76]). Aybeg al-Afram, a member of the Sāḥiliyyah (i.e., the unit from which Baybars himself hailed) known as amīr jāndār, was a senior officer who received part of a village as freehold in the aftermath of the campaign. See Amitai-Preiss, ”The Mamluk Officer Class,” 296 (no. 29). This amir can probably be identified with ‘Izz al-Dīn Amīr Jandār, who had brought the wood for the siege machines early in the campaign; Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir, Rawd, 230 (=Ibn al-Furat, Tārīkh al-Duwal, 1:85 [tr.
many of each category were actually present at the siege is unclear: the importance of rhyme in this list cannot be denied. In any event, three Sufi shaykhs who were present are named:ʿAlī al-Majnūn ("the crazy one"), Ilyās, and ʿAlī al-Bakkā ("the weeper"), who all enjoyed the sultan’s largess. Although the Mamluk army was basically a professional army of cavalrymen, and non-professionals and militiamen had been pretty much pushed to the side in these major campaigns (and the Mamluk army in general), a large crowd of religious figures, with an emphasis on Sufis of various ilks, was deemed desirable so as to encourage the fighters in their efforts for the sake of jihad. During the campaign, Baybars took time off to visit the nearby tomb of Shaykh ʿAlī ibn ʿAlīm, known as Sīdnā ʿAlī. It was particularly convenient to have a Muslim saint just "down the block," especially one whose tomb could not be defiled by the Franks, try as they had.49

The siege machines, reinforced by new ones brought from Damascus, kept up their pounding of the walls and city, and began to have an effect. When the trenches (here called, to confuse us, sarābāt; N.B. the long vowel over the second a) along the moat were completed, the gates referred to were opened into the moat. The assault was commenced on Monday, 8 Rajab/26 April, i.e., some five weeks after the investment had begun. Unfortunately, Ibn ʿAbd al-Zāhīr gives us no details beyond the fact that the city was taken that very day.50 We can imagine that the Mamluk fighters rushed across the moat of the city, threw up ladders, and scaled the walls, while being covered by missiles launched from bows and heavier weapons.

Having taken the city, it can be assumed that the Mamluks took up position along the inner moat, across from the citadel. For three days they probably maintained a withering fire of arrows, stones, and other missiles. This is testified to by the large concentration of arrowheads around the citadel on the barbican, as described in Raphael and Tepper’s article that follows this one. The large number of trebuchet stones and the clearly-perceived impact points on the extant walls shows that artillery was also trained on the citadel, although it is unclear how much of this

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49 Ibn ʿAbd al-Zāhīr, Rawḍ, 238–39 (=Ibn al-Furat, Tārīkh al-Duwal, 1:94–95 [tr. 2:75–76]). Interestingly enough, Baybars’ Sufi mentor Khadrī is not mentioned by this source, although he may have been in the vicinity and even predicted the date of the city’s capture; Ibn Shaddād, Tārīkh, 272–73. Ibn ʿAbd al- Zāhīr may have deliberately suppressed the information on Khadrī, since he later fell afoul of the sultan and was imprisoned. On this matter, see P. M. Holt, "An Early Source on Shaykh Khadrī al-Mihrānī," Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies 46 (1983): 33–39, esp. 35.
was from outside the city and how much from newly-erected or moved machines. The great number of arrowheads and trebuchet stones found in the environs of the citadel gate shows that the Mamluks especially concentrated their fire there, as would be expected.

After three days of softening up the citadel, the Mamluks commenced their final assault. Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir mentions the attack against the bāshūrah, the barbican or forward fortification surrounding the main citadel wall,\(^{51}\) which is clearly seen on the map of the site. On Thursday, 11 Rajab/29 April, the bāshūrah fell, with some of its wall collapsing; it is not stated why this happened, but it was surely due to either mining or the bombardment (or a combination of the two). The Mamluk soldiers scaled the walls of the bāshūrah and were among the Frankish defenders there before the latter knew what was upon them; the Muslim banners were soon flying from there. But the main citadel was still in the hands of the Franks. At this time, the sultan, who evidently was not in the thick of the fighting, offered an amān, or guarantee of safety, to the Franks. This was accepted, and a Mamluk officer was hoisted up to the citadel by ropes, with the sultan’s banner (sanjaq); the citadel gate must have been well barricaded from the inside or blocked with rubble. The officer took possession of the citadel, the Franks handed over their swords, and were taken into captivity. Forty days of fighting were now ended.\(^{52}\)

There is no description of fighting within the citadel. On the other hand, as seen in the article by Raphael and Tepper, a large number of arrowheads were found inside the citadel. These may be the remnants of Frankish arrows which were left behind. Possibly these were Mamluk arrows which were shot over the wall of the citadel. Finally, it may be that small groups of Mamluks managed to penetrate the citadel before it surrendered and these arrowheads are evidence of fighting at close quarters. This is a matter upon which it is difficult to decide, although I must admit that none of these possibilities are very satisfactory.

We should first examine what the reasons for the Mamluk victory here were, and then see whether one can find here indications of a general Mamluk strategy for the taking of fortresses. The Mamluk conquest of Arsūf was not a foregone conclusion at the commencement of the campaign, as the city was well fortified and garrisoned. Baybars, however, had several advantages: while much of his army was off in the north, and some had remained in Egypt, he still commanded a relatively large force of several thousand, perhaps even more than ten thousand, trained fighters. His army therefore greatly outnumbered the defenders, who have

\(^{50}\) Ibn ‘Abd al-Zāhir, Rawd, 238–39 (=Ibn al-Furat, Tārīkh al-Duwal, 1:95 [tr. 2:76]).

been estimated at 270 knights, plus auxiliary troops and civilians who could contribute to the defense.\(^{53}\) Secondly, once the Mongol threat was temporarily removed, the sultan could devote his full attention to the Franks virtually where he chose. Thirdly, it became increasingly clear as the siege wore on that the defenders at ArsUF had almost no hope of receiving reinforcements. The raiding forces which Baybars sent in various directions before and during the siege reduced any chance of such help being dispatched. There was hardly any possibility that the Franks could slip in help by sea, in spite of their almost total control of the sea along the Levant. The little harbor of ArsUF, such as it was, was totally covered by the Mamluk positions, including their artillery; Baybars himself is recorded shooting at ships.\(^{54}\) This also meant the Franks probably could not withdraw in a serious way by sea. Fourthly, as has been seen, the Mamluks employed sophisticated engineering techniques, as well as much artillery. Fifthly, Baybars’ presence and hands-on leadership meant that discipline and alertness among the Mamluks was at a fairly high level during the campaign. This is related to the sixth, and last, reason: morale. As the siege continued, it became increasingly clear that the Muslim army would prevail, spurring on the soldiers even more. The presence of Sufis and other religious figures contributed to the atmosphere of jihad which in turn strengthened morale. As the \(\text{êlan}\) in the Mamluk camp increased, desperation among the Franks would have also become amplified. In the long run, barring unexpected news from another quarter, an outbreak of disease among the besiegers, or serious—but increasingly unlikely—Frankish reinforcements, the Mamluk victory was almost a certainty.

In this campaign, we can already discern several of the characteristics of early Mamluk siege warfare: (1) a large concentration of troops; (2) careful logistical planning; (3) mining and other sophisticated engineering techniques; (4) massive use of artillery; (5) attention to matters of morale, discipline, and motivation; 6) a frontal attack after attrition and the completion of preparations. Most of these characteristics are found in Baybars’ later sieges, such as Safad, Beaufort (Shaqif Armun), Montfort (al-Qurayn) and Crak des Chevaliers (Hisn al-Akrad), as well as the sieges of his successors, e.g., Tripoli and Acre. The Mamluks, then, were not only first-class cavalrymen, but could transform themselves into infantrymen and sappers if the need arose. It was the latter skills which contributed much to their successes against the Franks.\(^{55}\)

\(^{52}\)Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir, Rawd, 241–42 (=Ibn al-Furat, Tarih al-Duwal, 1:96 [tr. 2:76–77]).
\(^{53}\)Runciman, History of the Crusades, 318.
\(^{54}\)Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir, Rawd, 237 (=Ibn al-Furat, Tarih al-Duwal, 1:93 [tr. 2:75]).
As is well-known, among Baybars’ acts after the conquest was the destruction of the city, its fortifications, and its harbor. To carry out the work, he divided different sections among the commanders. That this destruction was far from complete is seen by the impressive remnants of the moats and citadel. The policy of deliberate destruction of coastal cities which were conquered by the Mamluks had already been initiated in the aftermath of the Muslim victory at Caesarea, and would be continued virtually without exception after every Mamluk conquest along the coast. This strategy was examined in detail by the late Prof. David Ayalon, and there is therefore no reason to expand upon it here. Suffice it to say that Baybars had a keen understanding of the Mamluks’ weakness on the sea, as well as the numerical limitations of his army. Unable to devote large forces to garrison the conquered port cities, he deemed it wise to destroy them with their harbors to hinder a new Frankish landing and occupation. Long-term Mamluk security in the area was not to be guaranteed by large static forces divided into garrisons, but rather the existence of a fairly large and powerful, highly mobile army, which could be moved to meet every danger.

In the aftermath of the conquest of Caesarea and Arsuf, Baybars divided all the villages in their agricultural hinterland, 37 in number, among many of his officers, in total 61. This land, by the way, was not given as iqtâ’, or the right to collect revenue to pay for one’s military household, but rather as mulk, that is, private property. The recipients of this largesse were both senior and junior officers, including some rather obscure individuals. Most were being rewarded for their actions on the present campaign on the Palestinian coast, but a few were commanders who took part in the operation at al-Birah, demonstrating the sultan’s concern that they should not feel that they had been left out of the action, profitable as it was. The list of villages has been analyzed by several scholars, and virtually all have been identified and placed on the map, thereby providing us with a fairly accurate idea of the scope of the lordships of both Caesarea and Arsuf, although perhaps the border between them is not completely clear.

Finally, the conquest of these two towns, the fate of their inhabitants, and their destruction, must have made it clear to all—Franks, local Christians, local Muslim civilians, and members of the military elite—that there was a ”new sheriff” in

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19–22.
56Ibn ‘Abd al-Zahir, Rawḍ, 243 (=Ibn al-Furat, Tārīkh al-Duwal, 1:97 [tr. 2:78]).
58See Amitai-Preiss, ”The Mamluk Officer Class during the Reign of Sultan Baybars,” 267–300.
59F. M. Abel, ”La liste des donations de Baibars en Palestine d’après la charte de 663 H (1265),” Journal of the Palestine Oriental Society 19 (1939): 38–44; see also the discussion and reference
town with an unequivocal anti-Frankish policy. Baybars had commenced a strategy which was to result in the sizeable reduction of the Crusading entity; his successors, of course, were to bring this policy to fruition some fourteen years after his death. It is not a coincidence that it was about this time that Baybars adopted in inscriptions the sobriquet of *mubīd al-tatar wa-al-ifranj*, "the annihilator of Mongols and Franks," giving clear expression to the double-headed policy which he so forcefully adopted in 1265.

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Map 3. The city of Arsuf, showing the Frankish tunnel. (Tamar Sofer, The Cartography Laboratory, The Hebrew University of Jerusalem).
Figure 1. Suggested reconstruction of the city of Arsuafort. (From I. Roll et al., “Apollonia-Arsuf in the Crusader Period in Light of Recent Discoveries,” *Qadmoniot* 33, no. 1 [1999]: 18-31; reproduced with permission).
Fig. 2. A pile of *manjānīq* stones from Arṣūf (photograph by the author).

Fig. 3. The moat of the citadel of Arṣūf: a view of the north side looking west (photograph by the author).